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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : Case No.960689-CA 
v. 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (1996) 
(transfer from the Utah Supreme Court). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in this capital murder case when it 
recommended to the Board of Pardons and Parole that defendant should serve 20 
years before being eligible for parole? This Court reviews the sentencing decisions of 
a trial court for abuse of discretion. State v. Houk. 906 P.2d 907 (Utah App. 1995) 
(citing State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993)). Abuse of discretion 
"may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if 
the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive sentence.'" State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 
1120 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted). An appellate court may only find abuse "if 
it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." LL 
Because the sentencing question at issue is the trial court's advisory opinion to 
the Board of Pardons, the "pasture" under State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), is 
necessarily large and the trial court's discretion very broad. 
2. Did the statute requiring a trial court's opinion about a defendant's 
eligibility for parole violate the constitutional provision regarding separation of 
powers? Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, and this Court 
reviews a trial court's conclusions about constitutionality for correctness. State v. 
Robertson. 886 P.2d 85 (Utah 1994). When reviewing a statute for constitutionality, 
the statute is presumed constitutional, and this Court "resolve[s] any reasonable doubts 
in favor of constitutionality." Ryan v. Gold Cross Services. 903 P.2d 423 (Utah 1995) 
(citing Society of Separationists. Inc. v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993)). 
Defendant failed to raise this issue before the trial court. "As a general rule, 
appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised 
for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case 
involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 
1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided 
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any function 
appertaining to either of the others, except in cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-27-13(5)(a) (1996): 
In all sentences where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the 
judge imposing the sentence shall within 30 days from the date of the 
sentence, mail to the chief executive of the [B]oard [of Pardons and 
Parole] a statement in writing setting out the term for which, in his 
opinion, the offender sentenced should be imprisoned, and any 
information he may have regarding the character of the offender or any 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances connected with the offense for 
which the offender has been convicted. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant pled guilty to first degree murder, a capital offense, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(d) (1988),1 in exchange for a sentence to life 
imprisonment and agreement by the State not to recommend the death penalty or offer 
aggravating circumstances (R. 22-29). Defendant's plea was accepted, and he was 
sentenced on November 22, 1988, to life in prison (R. 30-32). The trial court 
recommended that defendant serve 20 years before being eligible for parole (R. 31). 
1
 The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "aggravated 
murder" for "murder in the first degree." 
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On December 4, 1991, defendant, pro se, moved to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 
100-113).2 On February 24, 1992, the trial court denied the motion (R. 150-54), and 
defendant appealed (R. 182). Defendant withdrew the trial court's denial of his motion 
as the basis for his appeal before the Court's decision, and argued instead that the trial 
court was in error for recommending that defendant serve a minimum of 20 years 
before being eligible for parole. In a unanimous decision, the Utah Supreme Court 
refused to address the issue since it was raised for the first time on appeal and since 
there were no extraordinary circumstances. State v. Smith. 866 P.2d 532 (Utah 1993). 
On December 4, 1992, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing. Id,. 
He asserted, among other things, that it was deficient performance for trial defense 
counsel to fail to object to the 20-year recommendation of the trial court. On 
November 22, 1993, the district court denied defendant's petition, adjudicating facts 
that are also at issue here. A certified copy of the district court's findings, conclusions, 
and order is attached (appendix A). 
On May 15, 1996, defendant filed a pro se motion alleging that his sentence was 
illegal, and requesting an order to modify it (R. 187-202). On July 19, 1996, the trial 
2
 The 30-day rule (s££ Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (1994); State v. Price. 837 
P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992)) was not yet in effect and may not be applied retroactively. 
State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993 (Utah 1993). 
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court denied defendant's motion and filed a Memorandum Opinion explaining its ruling 
(appendix B). Defendant, pro se, now appeals denial of this motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 3, 1988, defendant murdered James Glen Bray in a restroom at a 
rest stop in a failed robbery attempt (R. 55-60; S££ also appendix A, paragraph 24 at 
4). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant on November 22, 
1988, to "a term of incarceration for [defendant's] natural life in the Utah State Prison" 
(R. 31). In addition, the court recommended "that the Defendant not be allowed parole 
or even be considered for parole until he has served at least Twenty (20) years." I^ L 
After a hearing, the district court considering defendant's December 4, 1992 
habeas petition, adjudicated the following facts relevant to defendant's current appeal: 
17. [Trial defense counsel] correctly advised petitioner that the 
length of time he would actually serve in prison was under the exclusive 
control of the Board of Pardons, which would be greatly influenced by 
petitioner's conduct while in prison. 
18. The trial judge's 20-year recommendation is not a major factor 
relied on by the Board of Pardons in setting parole rehearing dates. Such 
recommendations are accorded greater or lesser weight depending upon 
their factual support. The judge's recommendation here was based solely 
on the facts of the crime itself. 
19. Defendants who have pled guilty to the capital offense of first 
degree murder ordinarily receive 20 to 25 year rehearing dates from the 
Board of Pardons. 
20. On November 12, 1991, petitioner went before the Utah 
Board of Pardons for an original parole grant hearing. Petitioner was 
given a rehearing date of October, 2008. 
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21. The Board of Pardons stated in writing its reasons for setting a 
20-year rehearing date. The reasons included petitioner's prison 
misconduct, but did not include the judge's recommendation. 
22. Petitioner has the right to petition the Board of Pardons for an 
earlier rehearing date. 
(See appendix A). 
Applying the law to the relevant facts, the district court also reached the 
following pertinent conclusion: 
8. The Board of Pardons is not bound by the trial court's 20-year 
recommendation. There is no support for petitioner's claim that, had Mr. 
Shumate objected to the 20-year recommendation, petitioner would have 
received a lesser sentence and/or an earlier rehearing date. 
LL 
Because defendant has not appealed the denial of his petition for habeas corpus, 
he should be bound by the facts adjudicated in that proceeding. a[W]hen there has 
been a prior adjudication of a factual issue and an application of a rule of law to those 
facts . . . res judicata bars a second adjudication of the same facts under the same rule 
of law." State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994) (quoting Salt Lake Citizens 
Congress v, Mountain States Tel & Tel, 846 P.2d 1245, 1251-52 (Utah 1992). 
Accordingly, the State asks this Court to take judicial notice of the adjudicated facts set 
out above as res judicata and the facts of this case. Utah R. Evid. 201; Riche v. Riche. 
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989) (Court may take judicial notice of the records and prior 
proceedings in the same case); see alSQ Gerrishv. Barnes. 844 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 
6 
1992) (citing Candelario v. Cook, 789 P.2d 710, 711 (Utah 1990) ("petitioner who had 
failed to appeal from denial of his first petition for habeas corpus could not challenge 
that denial when he appealed the denial of a subsequent petition"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when, in this capital murder 
case, it recommended that defendant serve 20 years before being eligible for 
parole. Defendant pled guilty to capital murder. A sentence to "a term of 
incarceration for [a defendant's] natural life" is an indeterminate sentence. There is a 
statutory requirement for a judge imposing an indeterminate sentence to recommend 
"the term for which, in his opinion, the offender sentenced should be imprisoned." 
Utah Code Ann. §77-27-13(5)(a) (1996). Such a recommendation is not binding on the 
Board of Pardons and Parole. The Board's written reasons for setting a 20-year 
rehearing date in defendant's case included defendant's prison misconduct, but did not 
include the judge's recommendation. The trial court's compliance with a statutory 
requirement was not an abuse of discretion. 
2. Because defendant failed to raise the constitutionality of the challenged 
statute below, that issue is waived absent exceptional circumstances that do not 
exist here. Appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional 
argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error 
or the case involves exceptional circumstances. It was not plain error for the trial court 
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to comply with a statutory requirement, and defendant has failed to assert let alone 
establish exceptional circumstances in this case. In any event, the challenged statute 
does not violate the constitutional provision regarding separation of powers because it 
does not transfer a function or give control of an Executive agency to the Judiciary. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN, 
IN THIS CAPITAL MURDER CASE, IT RECOMMENDED THAT 
DEFENDANT SERVE 20 YEARS BEFORE BEING ELIGIBLE FOR 
PAROLE 
Defendant argues that a life sentence is not indeterminate and that the trial court 
should not, therefore, have made a recommendation to the Board of Pardons and Parole 
related to the time he should serve (Def. Br. at 4), 
A. A life sentence is indeterminate. Following defendant's guilty plea, the trial 
court sentenced him "to a term of incarceration for his natural life in the Utah State 
Prison" (R. 31). Under Utah's sentencing scheme, all commitments to the state prison 
are considered indeterminate "unless otherwise provided by law." Utah Code Ann. 
§77-18-4(a). Defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that a life sentence is 
not an indeterminate sentence. Indeed, because defendant complains about the 
recommendation that he should serve 20 years before being eligible for release on 
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parole, his argument presumes that a life sentence is indeterminate because it may be 
modified by the Board of Pardons and Paroles. 
As the trial court noted, "It is evident that the Utah Legislature considers a life 
sentence for capital murder as an indeterminate sentence, since it has enacted, since the 
sentencing in this case, a new possible sentence in such cases, life without possibility of 
parole." (R. 208, emphasis in the original; see Utah Code Ann. §§76-3-20l(2)(f) 
(1992) and 76-3-207.5(2) (1992)). 
B. The trial court's opinion was not binding. In the State of Utah, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole, and not the trial court, has the authority to determine when and 
under what conditions sentenced prisoners "may be released upon parole, pardoned, 
. . . or have their . . . sentences commuted or terminated." Utah Code Ann. §77-27-
5(l)(a) (1996); State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995); Northern v. Barnes. 825 
P.2d 696 (Utah App. 1992). "Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving 
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence . . . are final and are not 
subject to judicial review." Utah Code Ann. §77-27-5(3) (1995). 
Given the Board's authority and discretion, the trial court's opinion was not 
binding (see appendix B, paragraph 8 at 6). As noted by the district court's findings in 
response to defendant's habeas petition, it is clear the Board did not consider the trial 
court's opinion binding: "The Board of Pardons stated in writing its reasons for setting 
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a 20-year rehearing date. The reasons included petitioner's prison misconduct, but did 
not include the judge's recommendation" (appendix B, paragraph 21 at 4). 
In sum, the trial court's compliance with a statutory requirement was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Point II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO RAISE THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHALLENGED STATUTE 
BELOW, THAT ISSUE IS WAIVED ABSENT EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DO NOT EXIST HERE 
Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the statutory requirement for 
the trial court's opinion violates the separation of powers provision of the Utah 
Constitution (Def. Br. at 12; sL R. 187-202; sss. Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 
1). Separation of powers means "that one department of the government cannot control 
the judgment or official acts of another department acting within its proper sphere of 
governmental power, within the scope of its authority." Matheson v. Ferry. 641 P.2d 
674, 678 (Utah 1982) (quoting Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission. 101 Utah 245, 
117 P.2d 298 (1941) (citing Marbury v. Madison. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803))). 
A. Waiver. Appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a 
constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances. Brown. 856 
P.2d at 359. In affirming defendant's first direct appeal in this case, the Utah Supreme 
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Court wrote, "It is black-letter law that an appellate court will not address issues raised 
for the first time on appeal except in extraordinary circumstances that do not exist 
here." Smith, 866 P.2d at 532. 
It was not plain error for the trial court to comply with a statutory requirement, 
and defendant has failed to assert let alone establish exceptional circumstances in this 
case (£££ Def. Br. at 6-8). 
B. No violation. In any event, neither the now-challenged statute, nor the trial 
court's compliance, violated the constitutional provision regarding separation of 
powers. The statute neither transferred a function of an Executive agency to the 
Judiciary, nor did the trial court usurp control of the judgment or officials acts of an 
Executive agency. The statute itself requires only that the trial court provide the Board 
with a nonbinding opinion, information regarding the character of the offender, and any 
aggravating or mitigating information in its possession. Utah Code Ann. §77-27-
13(5)(a) (1996). It is implicit that this information is to aid the Board in carrying out 
its functions. In addition, the trial court did not usurp control of the Board, but simply 
provided information: its opinion was styled as a recommendation rather than a 
judgment, order, or decree (R. 31). It is therefore clear that there was no violation of 
separation of powers. Sfifi alSQ State v. Bishop. 717 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Utah 1986) (the 
minimum mandatory sentencing provision in the child sodomy statute does not infringe 
the separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution). 
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Therefore, even if he is excused from his waiver, defendant's constitutional 
argument is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order denying defendant's motion to modify his sentence should 
be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^fUday of February, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
(BARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing motion and order 
for enlargement of time was mailed to Tracy Eugene Smith, P.O. Box 250, Draper, 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Petitioner, : OF LAW AND ORDER 
v. : 
HANK GALETKA, UTAH STATE : Case No. 930900217 HC 
PRISON, AND STATE OF UTAH 
Respondents, : Judge David S. Young 
Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus came before 
the Court for an evidentiary hearing August 26, 1993, the Honorable 
David S. Young presiding. Petitioner was present and was 
represented by Craig S. Cook. Respondents were represented by 
Angela F. Micklos and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorneys 
General. Witnesses from out of town and out of State being 
present, the Court proceeded to hear the merits of the petition and 
reserved ruling on the State's motion to dismiss on procedural 
grounds. After hearing testimony, receiving evidence, and 
considering counsels' arguments, the Court enters the following: 
IV.-.-
NOV 22 1993 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 14, 1988, petitioner pled guilty to first 
degree murder, a capital offense. The trial court sentenced 
petitioner to life imprisonment. 
2. The trial court recommended that petitioner spend at 
least 20 years in prison prior to being considered for parole. 
3. During, his criminal proceedings, petitioner was 
represented by James Shumate. 
4. Mr. Shumate did not object to the trial court's 20-year 
recommendation. 
5. Mr. Shumate did not request a presentence investigation 
report. 
6. Based on all available information, Mr. Shumate 
reasonably believed that a presentence report would detail 
petitioner's prior crimes, and on balance, would be a negative 
factor in the sentencing decision. 
7. Petitioner presented no evidence that the presentence 
report would have contained mitigating information. 
8. Mr. Shumate did not call mitigating witnesses at 
petitioner's sentencing hearing. 
9. Petitioner presented no evidence of what testimony any 
mitigating witnesses would have given, had they been called at the 
sentencing hearing. 
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10. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Shumate did not make a 
statement on petitioner's behalf, having previously argued all 
mitigating factors to the Court in chambers during a plea 
conference. 
11. Petitioner made a statement on his own behalf, prior to 
being sentenced. 
12. Prior to being sentenced, petitioner knew that he faced 
a maximum of life imprisonment. 
13. By entering a guilty plea, petitioner avoided the death 
penalty, which was his primary objective in pleading guilty. 
14. A condition of the plea bargain was that petitioner would 
have been able to withdraw his plea if the trial court had imposed 
the death penalty. 
15. Mr. Shumate correctly advised petitioner that the Court 
would almost certainly impose a sentence up to and including life 
imprisonment. 
16. Mr. Shumate opined to petitioner that he might spend five 
to seven years in prison. 
17. Mr. Shumate correctly advised petitioner that the length 
of time he would actually serve in prison was under the exclusive 
control of the Board of Pardons, which would be greatly influenced 
by petitioner's conduct while in prison. 
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18. The trial judge's 20-year recommendation is not a major 
factor relied on by the Board of Pardons in setting parole 
rehearing dates. Such recommendations are accorded greater or 
lesser weight depending upon their factual support. The judge's 
recommendation here was based solely on the facts of the crime 
itself. 
19. Defendants who have pled guilty to the capital offense of 
first degree murder ordinarily receive 20 to 25 year rehearing 
dates from the Board of Pardons. 
20. On November 12, 1991, petitioner went before the Utah 
Board of Pardons for an original parole grant hearing. Petitioner 
was given a rehearing date of October, 2008. 
21. The Board of Pardons stated in writing its reasons for 
setting a 20-year rehearing date. The reasons included 
petitioner's prison misconduct, but did not include the judge's 
recommendation. 
22. Petitioner has the right to petition the Board of Pardons 
for an earlier rehearing date. 
23. The State's case against petitioner was strong, based 
upon eyewitness testimony and the testimony of petitioner's 
companion, Timothy Miller. 
24. Mr. Shumate testified that petitioner confessed to him 
that his purpose in approaching the victim was to obtain money, by 
4 
violent means if necessary, and that he shot the victim without 
provocation. 
25. Had petitioner known that the judge was going to 
recommend 20 years incarceration, petitioner might still have pled 
guilty. 
26. Petitioner never testified that but for his counsel's 
alleged deficiencies, petitioner would not have pled guilty but 
would have insisted upon going to trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, both that Mr. Shumate's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and that petitioner was 
prejudiced by any unreasonable representation. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
2. In order to meet the prejudice prong, petitioner must 
demonstrate that but for Mr. Shumate's errors, there is a 
reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable 
sentence and rehearing date. With respect to petitioner's claim 
that his plea was involuntary due to Mr. Shumate's ineffectiveness, 
petitioner must demonstrate that but for Mr. Shumate's error, 
petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
upon going to trial. See Strickland, supra; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
5 
U.S. 52 (1985). 
3. Mr. Shumate's representation was more than adequate; it 
did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
4. Even if Mr. Shumate committed error, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate prejudice. 
5. Petitioner was well aware when he pled guilty that he 
faced a life sentence. 
6. The trial court had only three sentencing options: 
probation, life imprisonment, and the death penalty. 
7. Petitioner has failed to show that he would have received 
a lesser sentence if Mr. Shumate had requested a presentence 
investigation report, called mitigating witnesses, or made a 
statement on petitioner's behalf at sentencing. 
8. The Board of Pardons is not bound by the trial court's 
20-year recommendation. There is no support for petitioner's claim 
that, had Mr. Shumate objected to the 20-year recommendation, 
petitioner would have received a lesser sentence and/or an earlier 
rehearing date. 
ORDER 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED as follows: The petition for habeas corpus or post-
conviction relief is denied. 
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Approved as to form: 
Craig S. Cook 
Attorney for petitioner 
.'-''i^ RTcSALT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing unsigned FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
was mailed this November, 1993 to: 
Craig S. Cook, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
tli^jL'i'mM.) 
Appendix B 
IF 0 1 I I ID 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DIStMc^ 1"6 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF ^ ^ g ^ y ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH, | MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Plaintiff, 
vs. i CASE NO. 631 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
I 
Defendant. S 
The defendant, Tracy Eugene Smith, entered a plea of guilty to the crime of Murder 
in the First Degree, a capital felony, on November 14, 1988. The Court sentenced him to 
serve a life sentence and recommended to the Board of Pardons that he serve at least 20 
years before being allowed parole. The defendant has since filed at least one appeal and 
several petitions for extraordinary relief. 
On May 15, 1996, the defendant caused to be filed a "Motion for an Order of Court 
Correcting a Sentence that was Imposed in an Illegal Manner/ The defendant moves the 
Court to correct or modify the sentence given by deleting the Court's recommendation that 
the defendant serve 20 years before being paroled. The defendant correctly argues that the 
Court can correct an illegal sentence at any time. (See Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.) 
The alleged illegality raised by the defendant is that the Court sentenced the defendant 
to a life sentence and then made a recommendation pursuant to 77-27-13(5) UCA. The 
defendant argues that the Court acted illegally because that statutory provision, by its own 
terms, applies only to cases where an "indeterminate sentence is imposed." Defendant takes 
- 2 -
the position, citing no authority supporting his view, that a life sentence is not an 
indeterminate sentence. 
The Court now holds that the position of the defendant is incorrect under the Utah 
sentencing scheme. In fact a life sentence for Murder, a capital felony, is an indeterminate 
sentence. Therefore the sentence is not illegal. 
Under Utah's sentencing scheme, all commitments to prison are considered 
indeterminate sentences unless otherwise provided by law. (77-18-4 UCA) Utah's 
Constitution and statutes provide for a Board of Pardons which body is charged with the 
authority and responsibility of determining whether a sentence will be fully served, modified, 
or terminated. (See 77-27-5 UCA; Andrus v. Turner. 590 P.2d 363; Raslins v. Holden. 869 
P-2d958.) 
The Board of Pardons has unfettered discretion in carrying out its function and its 
decisions are not subject to judicial scrutiny, except in limited cases. 
An indeterminate sentence is one fixed by the sentencing authority (the Court) as a 
maximum sentence or within a possible minimum/maximum range, understanding that the 
actual time to be serve will be later determined by another entity, the Board of Pardons.1 
The alternative plan, determinate sentencing, is used in some states and jurisdictions. Under 
determinate sentencing the Court fixes the exact number of years, months or days to be 
served by the defendant and no other entity has authority to require more or less, as long as 
the sentence is legally permissible. This is not Utah's approach to sentencing. 
*See Mutart v. Pratt. 170 P.67; State v. Empev. 239 P.25; Lee Lim v. Davis. 284 
P.232. 
A life sentence for capital murder is an indeterminate sentence modifiable by the 
Board of Pardons. Otherwise the Court's recommendation of 20 years before parole would 
be irrelevant and meaningless and this Motion would never have been made. It is evident 
that the Utah Legislature considers a life sentence for capital murder as an indeterminate 
sentence, since it has enacted, since the sentencing in this case, a new possible sentence in 
such cases, life without possibility of parole. (See 76-3-201 UCA) 
The defendant's Motion is denied. The sentence in his case was not illegal as he 
complains. 
DATED this C> "day of July 1996. 
50?? 
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